Geopolitics, Memory, and the Limits of Cooperation: Russia, the West, and the Question of Hegemony

The discussion around Russian foreign policy, Western responses, and the ideas of thinkers such as Alexander Dugin sits at the intersection of history, geography, and political psychology. At its core lies a persistent question: are present Russian actions driven primarily by ideology, by structural geopolitical constraints, or by a long historical memory of insecurity? And, connected to this, can the enduring tension between Russia and the Western-led international order be resolved through cooperation and integration, similar to the way post-war Europe overcame its internal conflicts?

A useful starting point is the intellectual framework of Alexander Dugin, a Russian political philosopher whose work, particularly in texts such as Eurasian Mission, proposes that Russia is not merely a nation-state but a distinct civilization. In his view, Russia constitutes the core of a broader Eurasian space that stands in opposition to what he terms the Atlantic world, dominated by the United States and NATO. Within this worldview, the global order is fundamentally multipolar, composed of competing civilizational blocs rather than a single liberal universal system. Europe, in this schema, is not fully autonomous but a contested zone between Atlantic and Eurasian influence.

However, it is important to distinguish between Dugin as an ideologue and the actual drivers of Russian state behavior. While Dugin provides a philosophical and civilizational vocabulary that frames geopolitics as a struggle between land-based and sea-based powers, there is limited evidence to suggest that he is the primary architect of Russian foreign policy. President Vladimir Putin, by contrast, is more accurately described as a pragmatic strategist shaped by security institutions and traditional great-power thinking rather than by metaphysical civilizational theories. The overlap between Dugin’s ideas and Russian policy is therefore better understood as partial convergence rather than direct intellectual dependency.

The deeper roots of Russian strategic behavior lie in historical experience and geography. Analysts such as George Friedman and Peter Zeihan emphasize that Russia’s position on the vast Eurasian plain exposes it to repeated historical invasions from the west. Unlike states protected by oceans or mountain barriers, Russia has historically lacked secure natural frontiers. This vulnerability is often illustrated through repeated invasions such as Napoleon’s 1812 campaign and the German invasion of 1941 under Operation Barbarossa. These experiences contributed to a strategic culture in which security is associated not with fixed borders but with strategic depth.

From this perspective, Russian efforts to maintain influence over neighboring regions can be interpreted as attempts to create buffer zones that reduce perceived vulnerability. The collapse of the Soviet Union intensified this perception, as Moscow lost significant territorial depth and saw former Soviet republics move into Western political and military structures. Countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia became central to this geopolitical sensitivity, as their alignment choices directly affect Russia’s sense of strategic security.

The West, however, developed its own historical memory of Russian expansion. During the Cold War, large parts of Eastern Europe were incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence, with countries such as Poland, East Germany, and Hungary experiencing limited sovereignty under Moscow-aligned systems. For many of these states, integration into NATO and the European Union was not an act of provocation but a mechanism of security insurance against renewed domination. As a result, NATO expansion is perceived in Western discourse as stabilizing, while in Russian discourse it is often interpreted as encroachment.

This dynamic creates what international relations theory describes as a security dilemma. Actions taken by one side to increase its security are interpreted by the other side as threats, prompting countermeasures that further escalate tensions. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust. Russian efforts to maintain influence in Ukraine, for example, are interpreted in Moscow as necessary for preventing strategic encirclement, while in Kyiv and Western capitals they are seen as violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In this sense, Dugin’s ideological framework does not create Russian geopolitical behavior but rather articulates and intensifies existing structural narratives. Russian strategic thinking predates him by centuries, drawing on imperial history, Soviet security doctrines, and long-standing concerns about Western encroachment. Dugin’s contribution is to provide a civilizational and philosophical justification for these patterns, transforming geopolitical anxieties into a broader ideological narrative of Eurasian destiny and resistance to liberal universalism.

Given this deeply rooted mutual suspicion, the question arises whether cooperation and integration could offer a viable solution. Historical precedent within Europe suggests that reconciliation between former adversaries is possible. After the devastation of the Second World War, Western European states, particularly Germany and France, transformed their relationship through economic integration. Institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community and later the European Union created a framework in which war between member states became not only undesirable but structurally improbable. Economic interdependence, legal integration, and shared institutions helped convert historical enemies into partners.

This model raises the question of whether a similar approach could work in the broader Eurasian context. In theory, deep economic integration between Russia and Western Europe could reduce incentives for conflict by increasing the costs of confrontation. However, the historical case of Russia and Europe also illustrates the limitations of economic interdependence alone. Even prior to recent geopolitical ruptures, Russia and countries such as Germany maintained significant trade relations, particularly in energy. Despite this, these ties did not prevent a deterioration of political relations and ultimately armed conflict in Ukraine. This suggests that economic ties, while important, are insufficient without parallel political and security trust.

The core obstacle lies in fundamentally different conceptions of international order. Post-war Western Europe gradually moved toward a system based on shared sovereignty, legal constraints, and institutionalized cooperation. Russian strategic culture, by contrast, has often remained anchored in concepts such as spheres of influence, strategic depth, and hierarchical power balancing. These differing logics make it difficult to construct a common security architecture, even when mutual economic interests exist.

A sustainable resolution would therefore require more than economic cooperation. It would necessitate a transformation of security perceptions on both sides, including credible guarantees, institutional frameworks, and mutual recognition of legitimate security concerns. Historical reconciliation processes, such as Franco-German rapprochement, demonstrate that even deep historical animosities can be overcome, but only under conditions of sustained political will, structural change, and shared incentives.

Ultimately, the Russian-Western relationship is shaped by a combination of geography, history, and political imagination. Dugin represents one intellectual articulation of Russian civilizational thought, but not its origin. Putin’s policies reflect a broader tradition of statecraft rooted in security imperatives rather than ideological doctrine alone. The West’s response is similarly shaped by its own historical experiences and institutional evolution. Between these perspectives lies a persistent structural tension that cannot be resolved through narrative alone.

Whether this tension can eventually be transformed into cooperation remains an open question. History shows that reconciliation is possible, but it also shows that it requires more than proximity or trade. It requires a shared understanding of security itself. Until such a transformation occurs, the relationship between Russia and the Western world will likely continue to oscillate between cautious engagement and strategic confrontation, shaped as much by memory as by material interest.