Strategic Miscalculation and Military Outcomes in South Asia: A Clausewitzian Reading of Pakistan-India Conflicts
The modern military history of South Asia, particularly the series of conflicts between Pakistan and India, is often examined through a Clausewitzian framework that emphasizes the relationship between war, politics, uncertainty, and the limits of military force. Across several major conflicts, including the wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999, a recurring theme in parts of the strategic literature is the persistent gap between military planning assumptions and political reality. While battlefield performance varied across these wars, critics of strategic decision-making often argue that difficulties arose less from tactical execution than from flawed expectations about escalation, international response, and political outcomes. Clausewitz’s central argument in On War is that war is not an autonomous activity but a continuation of politics by other means. Military force only has meaning if it is clearly subordinated to political objectives and if planners accurately anticipate how adversaries,...