Power, Constraint, and Illusion: The Limits of Presidential Control in American Foreign Policy

The United States has long maintained a uniquely expert-driven approach to foreign policy, supported by an ecosystem of technocrats, analysts, academics, and policy institutes. Yet even with this institutional expertise, landmark failures - like Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria - have repeatedly demonstrated that expertise does not guarantee strategic success. The paradox is not the absence of knowledge but how that knowledge is often overridden by political, bureaucratic, and structural constraints.

Figures like John Bolton and Condoleezza Rice highlight the ideological debates within the U.S. foreign policy elite. Bolton, frequently labeled a neoconservative, is better understood as a hawkish realist. He rejects democratization and nation-building, treating military power as a hammer to eliminate threats, with little concern for managing aftermath. Rice, in contrast, though steeped in realist tradition, embraced neoconservative goals of transforming failing states, believing long-term U.S. engagement and democracy promotion were essential for security. This difference underscores the neoconservative insistence - championed by Irving Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz - that democratization is not optional but central to moral and strategic commitments.

Bolton’s position on Iran exemplifies his approach. He has advocated for military strikes to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat, declaring the regime existential. Yet, he consistently fails to provide a realistic strategy for the aftermath. Iran, unlike Libya or Syria, is a geopolitically significant nation of over 85 million, with a formidable state structure and regional reach. Destabilization risks regional escalation involving Israel, Gulf states, Russia, China, and disruption of global energy markets. The fragile post-conflict environment would likely be chaotic, opening space for guerrilla warfare, proxy battles, and humanitarian crises. Even President Trump, despite sharing Bolton’s hawkish instincts, eschewed full-scale war in favor of “maximum pressure” sanctions and occasional strikes, resisting broad regime-change operations.

That approach shifted dramatically on June 22, 2025, when the U.S. executed “Operation Midnight Hammer,” striking Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites with B‑2 stealth bombers, Massive Ordnance Penetrators, cruise missiles, and coordinated deception tactics. It marked the most expansive use of bunker-buster bombs in U.S. history and represented America’s first direct military involvement in the Iran-Israel war. President Trump celebrated it as a “spectacular military success,” though his administration warned that this was not about regime change. Nonetheless, his rhetoric on regime change remained ambiguous. Israel praised the strike as precise and decisive. Iran responded with missile attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar, while experts cautioned that the full extent of the damage and geopolitical fallout remained unclear. Congressional debates over war powers erupted in Washington, highlighting internal fractures and the absence of public planning for post-strike scenarios.

The June 22 strikes crystallize Friedman’s core thesis: individual presidents, no matter their acumen, operate within constraints - geography, bureaucracy, Congress, global markets, and institutional inertia. Major decisions are shaped not by presidential whim but by collective processes. The national security inner circle - chiefs of staff, NSA, defense and state secretaries - control the agendas, frame issues, and package choices for the president. Presidents choose, but within a curated menu shaped by ideology, loyalty, and interagency negotiation.

Even supposedly apolitical experts face systemic pressures. Dissent risks marginalization; alignment secures access. The 2003 WMD fiasco exemplifies how cautious analysts were overshadowed by political momentum. The system rewards conformity, not courage.

Yet many assert that in the turbulent Middle East, power projection matters. Appeasement is often perceived as weakness. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Assad’s regime have responded only to deterrence, not diplomacy. Thus a stronger U.S. posture may be justified - but only if tightly wargamed and tied to clear political objectives. Military action without an exit plan is not strategy; it’s reaction.

American power is vast, but not infinite. The illusion that presidents can reshape global affairs with sheer force is seductive but false. Real strategy demands understanding of enduring constraints: institutions, interests, geography, and history. The lesson - from Bolton vs. Rice, from Iraq to Iran, and from cabinets to bunkers - is that power must be wielded not only decisively, but smartly, sustainably, and humbly.