The Lone Voice of Reason: General Sosabowski and the Tragedy of Operation Market Garden

Operation Market Garden was among the most audacious Allied offensives of the Second World War. Designed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the plan aimed to end the war by Christmas 1944 through a narrow thrust deep into the Netherlands, seizing a corridor of bridges from Eindhoven to Arnhem using airborne troops supported by British armor. But from the outset, the plan violated basic military common sense. It relied entirely on a single elevated road - Hell’s Highway - stretching across exposed lowlands, flanked by German forces, and vulnerable to counterattack. Even to an untrained eye, concentrating an entire operation on such a narrow axis of advance seemed reckless. In hindsight, the disaster that unfolded was less a product of misfortune than of deeply flawed assumptions, rigid planning, and collective self-deception.

What is striking is not that Market Garden failed, but that so few commanders challenged its premise before it began. Field Marshal Montgomery’s prestige and force of personality discouraged dissent. Allied high command, buoyed by the rapid breakout from Normandy, was gripped by overconfidence. Intelligence warnings - particularly about the presence of elite German SS Panzer divisions near Arnhem - were downplayed or ignored. The desire for a decisive blow before winter, combined with inter-Allied rivalries and political pressure, created a climate in which caution was viewed as defeatism. Optimism was equated with loyalty, and those who voiced doubts were marginalized.

Among the very few who dared to speak out was General StanisÅ‚aw Sosabowski, commander of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade. A career soldier of exceptional intellect and integrity, Sosabowski was known for his discipline, tactical acumen, and loyalty to his men. From the outset, he identified serious flaws in the Market Garden plan. He warned that the drop zones selected for his brigade were dangerously far from their objectives - especially the Arnhem bridge - and that the enemy’s strength had been grossly underestimated. He argued that German resistance, particularly from SS Panzer units, would be far more determined than planners assumed. His suggestions for alternative drop zones and a more cautious timetable were dismissed.

Sosabowski’s foresight was painfully validated. The British 1st Airborne Division was quickly surrounded at Arnhem, and despite desperate attempts by the Polish brigade to reach them, the link-up failed. The Waal River crossing at Nijmegen, a near-suicidal mission led by two American companies, became necessary precisely because the plan had left no margin for delay or failure. It is one of history’s bitter ironies that those who had embraced the flawed plan emerged with their reputations intact, while Sosabowski - who had tried to prevent the calamity - was scapegoated. His blunt manner, refusal to flatter superiors, and status as a Polish outsider made him a convenient target. In December 1944, he was relieved of command. His men, who respected him deeply, were shocked.

Sosabowski paid a heavy price for his honesty. After the war, he remained in exile, refusing to return to a Poland under communist control. He lived modestly in London, working in a factory, largely forgotten by the public. Yet history, over time, reversed the verdict. Veterans, historians, and even British officers later admitted that Sosabowski had been right. General Horrocks called his treatment “most unfair,” and Cornelius Ryan described him as the “Cassandra of Market Garden.” In 2006, the Dutch government posthumously awarded Sosabowski and his brigade the Military Order of William, recognizing not only their bravery but the injustice they had endured.

General Stanisław Sosabowski stands as a symbol of moral courage in a time of strategic blindness. He saw clearly what others refused to see and had the integrity to speak out. His story is a reminder that in war, as in life, telling the truth can come at great personal cost - but that integrity, in the end, outlives expedience.


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